This paper concerns three significant aspects of twentieth century history in both Australia and Britain: trade unions, railways and war. During the world wars trade unionists in both countries worked under poor conditions, and sometimes endured loss of hard-won privileges in order to further the war effort, and in the hope that governments and employers would acknowledge their sacrifices and redress their grievances once peace was restored. The paper discusses two instances, one in Western Australia and one in Britain, where these grievances were not addressed after the War, and examines the different outcomes. After comparing the circumstances in which the Australian Standard Garratt and the WD 'Austerity' heavy freight locomotives were produced, it explores the problems with these engines and the outcomes arising from union grievances. Finally, the paper posits that studying the outcomes of these industrial disputes on the railways, arising out of wartime conditions, furthers our understanding of the stresses of war on society.
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regarded as being the end of an engine's economic life. This circumstance had arisen because locomotive production at Midland ceased during the Depression and had not recovered sufficiently prior to the war. Additionally, the WAGR had responded to an urgent request from the Federal Government in 1942 for twenty-six shunting engines for use in the Northern Territory, further depleting their stock. 16 The Beyer-Garratt and its Australian modifications H.W. Garratt designed the original, articulated engine in 1911. Because of its ability to work on light lines and negotiate tight bends while pulling heavy loads, the Garratt was used extensively on narrow gauge railways in Western Australia and Tasmania. 17 There were no major problems with the MSA engines, a fact that was noted by the Royal Commissioner in his 1946 Report. 18 The findings of this Report will be discussed in detail later in this paper.
In 1942, the Commonwealth Land Transport Board appointed Jack Ellis, the WA Commissioner of Railways, to investigate the carrying capacity of all three-footsix-inch gauges in Western Australia and Queensland, where the impact of the Pacific war was greatest. Ellis recommended building light, medium and heavy models of locomotives on the Garratt principle. To reduce the Garratt's rigid wheelbase from 13 feet 6 inches to 9 feet to comply with Queensland restrictions, the leading coupled 6 wheels were made flangeless, giving the locomotive greater ease in riding around severe curves. 19 The flangeless wheels would cause derailments on the new engines.
The Commonwealth Land Transport Board approached Beyer, Peacock, who offered two models, but the Board rejected both, and a subsequent offer of drawings only, as too expensive. Instead, the War Cabinet accepted the Board's recommendation to design and build the locomotives in Australia. This decision was probably based on the success of Mills' MSA engines, as well as expense. Using
Beyer, Peacock's earlier type 120328 drawing as a basis, Mills, now Chief
Mechanical Engineer at the WAGR Workshops, designed and supervised construction of the ASG engine. Mills' modifications created a larger firebox, boiler, coal bunker and water tanks, enabling the engine to travel long distances, but increased the overall weight by 9.5 Imperial tons (8.6 metric tonnes). This additional weight was decreased by reducing the thickness of plates used for frame stays, cutting holes in the sides of the boiler cradle frame and in main plates of engine frames, making some of the control rods hollow, and introducing other 'economy features', which arguably weakened the structure of the locomotive. 20 The Commonwealth Land Transport Board spread the manufacture of the components over 105 different shops, with four assembly points including Midland.
The manufacturers did not build a prototype for rigorous testing before mass production; the first locomotive was built in four months and, as mentioned previously, entered service in Queensland in October 1943. 21 By April 1944, after being in service only a few months, ten ASG engines were standing idle at the Rockhampton Workshops in Central Queensland, following the discovery of serious defects in their design. heavy loads over 'light, impoverished, or imperfect track', and it had many modifications including flangeless centre coupled wheels to aid in negotiating tight curves. 23 In this characteristic as well as size, the 2-10-0 (or 'WD') compares more closely to the ASG, than other 'Austerity' models used in Britain. 24 Prior to this, American S160s (also called 'Austerity engines'), had arrived in
Britain at the end of 1942. British crews had not been trained to drive these imported engines, often working them in unfavourable conditions such as wartime blackout.
After the firebox of an S160 collapsed at Thurston, Suffolk, in the early hours of 12 January 1944, causing serious injuries to the driver and fireman, crews were ordered to maintain boiler pressure at or below 200 pounds, although the engines' official rating was 225 pounds. 25 But, in his report to the Ministry of War Transport, the accident investigator, J. L. M. Moore, regarded the driver and fireman as being at fault for not checking the test cocks to ascertain the level of water in the boiler.
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The British-built engines also met with opposition, but not initially from the footplate staff. Several railway managers opposed their introduction, with the Chief 36 This was a very different reaction from that of QGR, which had complied with the ban that the AFULE placed on the engines after they started derailing. By 1945, twenty ASGs were lying idle in Queensland sidings. 37 According to Whiting, the greatest opposition to ASGs came from the Commissioner, P.R.T.
Wills, who opposed the Commonwealth Land Transport Board's decision to construct them instead of the C17, a Queensland-built engine which, Wills believed, was more suited to that State's railway system. Whiting attributes this hostility at least partly to a conservative culture that had seen little technological innovation in several decades.
Unlike Western Australia, QR did not have a history of using Beyer-Garratt locomotives, having resisted previous attempts to import them from Britain, despite the fact that they were ideally suited to Queensland's light, narrow-rail lines, and proved to be so when introduced after the war. eliminating all bunker-first running. ASGs in the Workshops for repairs should be examined for defects mentioned by the Union. 40 The Union feared that the Railways Department would not honour the agreement, as evidenced by the fact that engine ASG30, which the Union claimed required major repairs and should be placed on low priority, was being repaired in the Workshops. Nor had the Department complied with the request to run ASGs only on single lines. Webb warned that if the Department continued to ignore these conditions, the Union would again instruct its members to stop working the locomotives. 41 On 22 October, Webb threatened to declare ASG30 black if it was repaired and put back into service, and he asked for work on it to cease.
Commissioner Ellis appeared to comply and tensions eased briefly. 42 By the end of 1945, however, Union and Departmental differences seemed irreconcilable. Ellis complained to Marshall of the 'irrationality' of seven 'modern, powerful engines standing idle' when the State's resources were so stretched. As the results of the Royal Commission would not be known for months, he 'strongly' recommended that the Government urge the Union to agree to repairs being made. 43 Yet even when the Union accepted compromise, the Department continued to be obstructive, for example, refusing to provide free pairs of goggles for crews working engines bunker first -which would have facilitated lifting the embargo -because they estimated that it would be necessary to provide at least eighty-two pairs. Soon, they argued, all crews would want goggles, and the expense could not be borne. 44 Considering the potential loss of freight revenues if the ASGs ceased operating, it was a false economy, but it indicates the extent to which WAGR Departmental policy was determined by financial constraints and short-term thinking. 46 He denied that union objections were based on a fear of job losses. Indeed, the Union advocated the use of more powerful engines and a broader gauge railway. 47 Certainly, there is no evidence of the Union making sustained criticism of any other engine on the WAGR system, and this also applied to the AFULE in the Eastern States, who, like ASLEF crews, adapted to imported American engines with little complaint. Railway staff involved in preparing and driving the engines testified that ASGs had excessive oil consumption, problems with wheel bearings running hot and more need of mechanical attention than any other engine; they had been involved in shunting mishaps because of faulty steam brakes, and they tore up track. 48 The divergence in points of view put by the Union and railway officials was starkly evident when Royston Macaulay Evans, the Chief Traffic Manager, gave evidence. Evans asserted that the ASG was 'in every way a safe, economical and satisfactory engine and is the answer to our transport problem of today and in the immediate future'. 49 Mills reiterated that the engines were 'completely safe'.
Although they had been 'completed hastily with little skilled assistance', they were 'regarded as a proud achievement'. He declared that safety had never been overlooked, nor ignored. WAGR had 'an unsurpassed record for safety', with no passenger fatalities. In 1945, Mills claimed, the ASG had lower repair costs than any other mainline engine. The strike not only represented a wider conflict between moderates and militants within the political and industrial branches of the Western Australian labour movement after World War II; 62 its economic impacts were significant: an estimated 90,000 people were thrown out of work, and power cuts had ramifications for industry and commerce. 63 In the Arbitration Court on 12 November, Justice Dunphy began deregistration proceedings against the Union for instigating an illegal strike. 64 Deregistration increased the Union's hostility towards the Arbitration Court, the State ALP and its Disputes Committee. The Union's General Committee resolved on 13
November not to resume negotiations unless the ASGs remained out of service and the suspended men were reinstated. The Union lost its appeal to the Supreme Court against deregistration, which took effect from 18 November. The government offered to appoint an independent engineer within ten days, establish 'an independent, adjudicating authority acceptable to the union' to determine the basis and conditions under which ASGs would operate, and withdraw all penalties from the suspended men if the Unionists would return to work. 65 But the Union remained adamant that it would be 'the final arbiter as to whether or not the ASG engines would run'. 66 Attempts by the Premier to influence the union rank and file made the situation even worse, with the Union closing ranks, and its Midland branch demanding that either the Cabinet resign or the government hold an election. 'No Garratts -no surrender'
was their blunt message. 67 On 21 November, the full bench of the Arbitration Court fined the Union £100 and each member of the Executive £10 for 'initiating an unjustifiable strike'
. November, and the Union re-registered. 69 No ASG was returned to traffic until the Midland Workshops had carried out modifications on all twenty-five, which were completed on 7 August 1948.
Problems with Austerity 'WD' engines. that 'a national strike was unthinkable at this juncture' as 'no industry more visibly epitomised the mobilisation for war'. 70 Although lacking serious design defects, problems footplate staff experienced with WD engines 71 included the glass breaking on water gauges, resulting in some cases of eye injuries; the driver's view being obscured by equipment or excessive steam; inadequate weather protection, and difficulties with fire door handles, sanding apparatus and vacuum brakes. Initially, there were problems with the firebox design of 2-8-0 models, which resulted in the drop gate mechanism in the ash pan warping and burning after a build up of ash and clinker. Cracks and failure of the copper firebox tubeplates became common after the war. 72 The executives of the private railway companies had either dismissed union requests for modifications as 'impractical' or blamed staff for being 'unfamiliar' with the engine, rather than accepting that there was any defect in the design. 73 Yet several months earlier, the Rail Executive had countermanded an order to overhaul the twenty-three remaining heavy freight 'Austerity' engines in Britain, the others having been sold overseas. 74 This suggests that they regarded the engines as being not worth the expense of repair. Give us the engines, we will do credit to the trade union and contribute our part to the success of the Labour Government. Ask the Driver who has had the gauge glass break on the road. Ask the fireman who has had a blow on the head with the regulator. Try yourself, to take a fire-iron out of the rack. Get Government attempts to introduce a standard railway gauge in all states, 86 but it is noting that in 1944, when the inefficiency of the nation's rail system and its incapacity to meet wartime demands was most evident, the Australian electorate had rejected a proposal to grant the Commonwealth a number of powers including 'to make laws with respect to the uniformity of railway gauges'. 87 In contrast, in the Bristol dispute, the ASLEF Central Executive appears to have wanted to avoid embarrassing the newly-elected Labour Government while it was passing the Transport Act that would introduce permanent government ownership of Britain's public transport system. Certainly Clement Atlee's Labour Government wished to avoid being side-tracked by industrial disputes. But unionists were mistaken if they thought that a state-owned system under a Labour government would be markedly different from the privately-owned railways. Nationalisation, according to Strangleman, 'represented a change of legal ownership but was marked by continuity in organizational and managerial structures, and this had important implications for both workers and managers in the industry…' 88 Griffiths 92 suggests that the militant view was gaining precedence, and that the patience which members had awaited the changes they believed would come with peace and nationalisation was exhausted.
In summary, the wartime circumstances in the which the ASGs and the 'Austerities' were constructed were quite similar, and although the outcomes were very different, it is suggested that these two cases illustrate the frustrations suffered by unionists during wartime, on the one hand trying to contribute to victory and on the other fighting to avoid unnecessary loss of wages and conditions -and in these cases, trying to maintain adequate safety standards despite pressure to cope with inferior or unfamiliar equipment . These cases assist our understanding of the pressures that workers, and their union executives, experienced during wartime -such as working in blackout conditions, working longer shifts and foregoing pay rises.
These pressures were not immediately alleviated with the coming of peace because of political and economic circumstances in which governments often found themselves after the cessation of hostilities.
Finally, what of the engines at the centre of these disputes? In Britain, despite some objections to Austerity engines expressed initially by rail management and later by some footplate staff, the dispute was brief, localised and disappeared with barely a trace. While, like the ASG, Austerity engines were replaced from the early 1950s in both Europe and Britain, it was largely due the advent of diesel and electric engines;
as testimony to their longevity, some 2-10-0s remained in service in Greece until the 1980s. 93 In his history of the Austerity engines, Rowledge writes that these 'stopgap'
engines were 'capable of valued service'. 94 [ Fig. 3 here Image of restored 2-10-0 (not attached 
